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Abstract: Previous studies have shown (varying degrees of) evidence of a negative impact of data breach announcements on 
the share price of publicly listed companies. Following on from this research, further studies have been carried out in 
assessing the economic impact of the introduction of legislation in this area to encourage firms to invest in cyber security 
and protect the privacy of data subjects. Existing research has been predominantly US centric. This paper looks at the impact 
of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) infringement fine announcements on the market value of mostly European 
publicly listed companies with a view to reinforcing the importance of data privacy compliance, thereby informing cyber 
security investment strategies for organisations. Using event study techniques, a dataset of 25 GDPR fine announcement 
events was analysed, and statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of around -1% on average up to three 
days after the event were identified. In almost all cases, this negative economic impact on market value far outweighed the 
monetary value of the fine itself, and relatively minor fines could result in major market valuation losses for companies, even 
those having large market capitalisations. A further dataset of four announcements where sizeable GDPR fines were 
subsequently appealed was also analysed and although positive returns for successful appeals were observed (and the 
reverse), they could not be shown to be statistically significant - perhaps due, at least in part, to COVID-19 related market 
volatility at that time. This research would be of benefit to business management, practitioners of cyber security, investors 
and shareholders as well as researchers in cyber security or related fields (pointers to future research are given). Data 
protection authorities may also find this work of interest. 
 
Keywords: cyber security, data privacy breaches, market value, economic impact, GDPR, event study 
1. Introduction 
The European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA, 2020) reported a “54% increase in the total number of 
[data] breaches by midyear 2019 compared with 2018”. Regarding the introduction of the General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018, ENISA also remark that “55% of the responders to a Eurobarometer 
survey responded that they are concern[sic] about their data being accessed by criminals and fraudsters”. Clearly 
there is major concern out there in the field of data privacy. The primary objective of the GDPR is to protect 
“fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal 
data” (Data Protection Act 2018). The requirement, therein, to notify data breaches to the relevant supervisory 
authority within 72 hours of becoming aware (where feasible), could reasonably be expected to increase 
visibility of non-compliance. For example, in the UK, before the introduction of the GDPR as the Data Protection 
Act (DPA), 2018, the preceding DPA (1998), according to the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO)1, stated 
“although there is no legal obligation on data controllers to report breaches of security which result in loss, 
release or corruption of personal data, the Information Commissioner believes serious breaches should be 
brought to the attention of his Office.” Prior to 2010, the ICO were limited to serving enforcement notices for 
contraventions of the DPA (1998), however in April 2010 the ICO was granted the power to issue fines of up to 
£500,000 on its own authority. For example, Sony Computer Entertainment Europe were fined £250,000 in 
January 2013 for a “serious breach” when their PlayStation Network was hacked (BBC 2013) and in 2016, TalkTalk 
were fined £400,000 for leaking personal data of almost 157,000 customers due to poor website security (BBC 
2016). Serious infringements under the GDPR, those violating the fundamental principles of the right to privacy 
and the right to be forgotten, could result in a fine of up to €20 million or 4% of the firm’s worldwide annual 
revenue from the preceding financial year (whichever amount is higher), a clear deterrent against carelessness 
concerning data privacy and security. Indeed, total fines issued by data protection authorities since the 
introduction of the GDPR currently stand at over €275m (CMS Legal 2021). 
 
This research is concerned with the impact the announcement of such GDPR fines has on the market value of 
publicly listed companies. Spanos and Angelis (2016) report that data breach announcements are associated 
with a negative impact on market value. Could it be that, since the introduction of the GDPR, a firm’s share price 
                                                                
1 The supervisory (data protection) authority of the UK (https://ico.org.uk) 
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may suffer a ‘double whammy’ of both initial breach notification and subsequent punitive action? This paper 
aims to assess the economic impact of the introduction of the GDPR on publicly listed companies through the 
application of fiscal penalties levied by its supervisory authorities on those firms which have suffered a data 
privacy breach. By gaining a greater understanding in this area it is hoped to encourage firms to invest more in 
cyber security measures to prevent such occurrences. To achieve this objective, the following research questions 
were considered: 
 Is there any impact on company market value of a publicly announced GDPR fine? 
 Do data analyses reveal any obvious patterns/correlations? 
 What is the impact of any fine successfully appealed and subsequently overturned or reduced? 
 How can the results inform cyber security investment strategies? 
 Can any conclusions be drawn about the introduction of the GDPR itself? 
This research will highlight the importance of data privacy and protection to business management and thus the 
need to invest in and improve their organisation’s cyber security posture2 thereby reducing the risk of data 
privacy breaches. Such insight would also assist practitioners of information security with business case 
justifications. This research would be of benefit to business management, practitioners of cyber security, 
investors and shareholders as well as researchers in cyber security or related fields. It could also be of value to 
data protection authorities to increase their understanding of the impact and enforcement of legislation on the 
economy. Another benefit of this study would be the European focus thereby beginning to offset the strong US 
bias of the existing literature in this area. 
2. Related work 
A systematic literature review concerning the impact of data breach events on the stock market carried out by 
Spanos and Angelis (2016) reports that, although research in this area was “quite limited”, the majority of studies 
(76%) found a statistically significant negative impact. For example, Lin et al. (2020) report a loss of 1.44% on 
average over a 5-day window. Andoh-Baidoo, Amoako-Gyampah and Osei-Bryson (2010) report -3.18% 
abnormal returns over a 3-day period. Cavusoglu, Mishra and Raghunathan (2004) cite -2.1% on average within 
two days after the announcement.  Goel and Shawky (2009) quote -1% in the days surrounding the event. These 
studies also note some correlations between these negative returns and, for example, industry sector. 
Tweneboah-Kodua, Atsu and Buchanan (2018), warn that “studying the cumulative effects of cyberattacks on 
prices of listed firms without grouping them into the various sectors may be non-informative”. They noted that 
financial services firms reacted more rapidly and more significantly than those in the technology sector. It was 
also observed by Campbell et al. (2003) that those breaches involving unauthorised access to confidential data 
were more likely to result in significant negative market reaction, which one would reasonably expect to apply 
across the board for this study. Such observations would support the idea of governments introducing legislation 
to not only counter this negative economic impact but also to help protect data subjects who are effectively 
innocent victims of such breaches of confidentiality. Indeed, the right to privacy is a component of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950) and the EU has sought to protect this right through legislation ever since 
with, firstly, the introduction of the European Data Protection Directive (1995) then the Privacy and Electronic 
Communications Directive (2002) and, in response to ever-evolving technology and increases in data transfers, 
the GDPR in 2018 along with the (delayed) ePrivacy Regulation due to repeal the 2002 Directive (European 
Commission 2021). 
 
This relatively recent introduction of the GDPR naturally limits the availability of research on its impact, so it is 
necessary to look elsewhere. The introduction of data breach notification laws in the US was found to reduce 
identity theft by over 6% on average (Romanosky, Telang & Acquisti 2011). Clearly if data subjects are rapidly 
made aware their personal data has been compromised, and which data, they should be better positioned to 
take preventative action. There are already, however, some criticisms of the effectiveness of the GPDR in this 
area as notification to data subjects is only required in certain “high risk” cases and where it would not place too 
onerous a burden on the reporting organisation (Nieuwesteeg & Faure 2018). Data breach notification laws have 
been widely adopted in the US, albeit not centrally – federal law in this area only covers certain specific sectors. 
Nevertheless, 47 jurisdictions have implemented their own notification legislation. In fact, the US could be 
considered an early adopter. In contrast the EU GDPR model is central and adopted by member states and 
                                                                
2 Cyber security posture includes not only governance and technical solutions but also training and awareness. 
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includes the notification requirement within the data protection law itself unlike, for example, Australia (Daly 
2018) where a separate law was introduced in early 2017. Goel and Shawky (2014) carried out a US based study 
examining the impact of data breach announcements on share price and found a significant reduction in negative 
returns after the enactment of both federal and state laws. Murciano-Goroff (2019) looked at Californian 
company investment in web server security following the introduction of state data breach notification law yet 
only noted a modest effect with server software being, at most, 2.8% newer. Indeed, Richardson, Smith and 
Watson (2019) argue that “companies are unlikely to change their investment patterns unless the cost of 
breaches increases dramatically or regulatory bodies enforce change” underpinning the need for an 
understanding of the impact and effectiveness of the GDPR on cyber security investment – an area which this 
research aims to inform as well as bringing an EU specific perspective to offset the strong US bias of previous 
studies. 
3. Methodology 
The high-level approach to this research was to download a list of publicly announced GDPR infringement fines 
from the Enforcement Tracker (CMS Legal 2021), filter this dataset for those cases involving publicly listed 
companies and analyse the impact of these announcements on share price using event study techniques. 
3.1 Event studies 
Event studies have been widely used to assess the impact of specific events on the share price of firms and 
thereby their market value and are described in detail in, for example, MacKinlay (1997). A key assumption of 
this methodology is the ability of the market to reflect all available information as per the efficient market 
hypothesis (e.g. Fama 1970). By observing share price movements in reaction to information regarding a specific 
event, such as a data breach announcement over a short time period (the event window) it is possible to deduce 
how the market reacted to that specific event, given there are no other confounding events during that time-
period. 
 
Figure 1: Event study timeline 
A common approach used in similar (data breach type) event studies is the market model (e.g. Cavusoglu et al. 
2004; Andoh-Baidoo et al. 2010; Hinz et al. 2015; Schatz & Bashroush 2016; Castillo & Falzon 2018; Tweneboah-
Kodua et al. 2018; Jeong et al. 2019) which uses an estimation window prior to the (shorter) event window (see 
Figure 1) to predict movement of the firm’s stock based on a regression analysis. Returns are assumed to follow 
a single factor model (1) where the return of firm i on day t  (𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is dependent on the corresponding daily return 
of the reference market (𝑅𝑚,𝑡) and the extent of the security’s responsiveness (𝛽𝑖) offset by its abnormal return 
(𝛼𝑖). The error term 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is expected to be zero with finite variance. Abnormal returns are calculated for the event 
window (2) and reported as a cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the whole event window (3). For cross-
sectional analyses a cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) was calculated for N events as shown in 
equation (4). 
 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ⋅ 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
(1) 
 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − (𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚,𝑡) 
(2) 
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3.2 Data collection 
The base dataset used to identify fine announcements was from the GDPR Enforcement Tracker. Although not 
professing to be an exhaustive list, when the data were downloaded in May 2020 this resulted in 277 records. 
Manually filtering these records for those involving publicly listed companies (or a subsidiary of a publicly listed 
company3) resulted in 71 rows. Some announcement dates were found to be missing and filled in from press 
reports and official data protection authority publications where applicable. It was necessary to exclude certain 
records due to a missing date such as Facebook (Germany) and Unicredit (Czech Republic/Slovakia). Events on 
the same day were consolidated into one e.g. Eni Gas e Luca, EDP Spain. Entries which had potentially 
overlapping event windows were also filtered e.g. Vodafone (2 events). Share price and market index data were 
extracted from Yahoo!Finance (2019) along with firm demographics such as annual revenue, market 
capitalisation and industry sector. Information was not available for all the events on Yahoo!Finance e.g. Louis 
Group (Cyprus), Xfera (now privately owned) and Avon Cosmetics (event was pre-public), thus these events had 
to be filtered out also, leaving 48 records. The most appropriate market index was chosen as a reference in each 
case (Kannan, Rees and Sridhar (2007) highlighted the importance of the market reference), ideally one which 
included the candidate company itself but adjusted, if needed, due to lack of availability of data in 
Yahoo!Finance. Some firms had multiple listings in which case the primary listing and associated index were 
used. The date range was limited, naturally, from the earliest fine since the introduction of the GDPR in 2018 
(actually, January 2019) until the date of download but it was decided to cap the data at 31/12/2019 in order to 
avoid market uncertainties due to COVID-19, that being a long-term confounding event in itself. This date 
capping reduced the dataset from 48 to 25 events for analysis. 
3.3 Data analysis 
To facilitate the analyses, R (R Core Team 2018)4 scripts were developed to pull share price and index data 
directly from Yahoo!Finance for each data record and then event studies run using an R package (Schimmer, 
Levchenko & Müller 2014) 5 using the market model as described above. Non-trading event days were defaulted 
to the next available trading day. An estimation window of 120 days was chosen consistent with e.g. Goel and 
Shawky (2009), Andoh-Baidoo et al. (2010), Schatz and Bashroush (2016), Richardson et al. (2019). In all cases 
the estimation window ended one trading day before the event window. Tweneboah-Kodua et al. (2018) 
recommend avoiding overlap of the estimation and event windows in this way to avoid “parameter 
contamination”. Although the event window should be broad enough to contain any uncertainty in the date of 
the event, the longer the window the less likely it is to detect abnormal returns (Dyckman, Philbrick, & Stephan 
1984). Previous studies have shown market reaction before the event date due to information leakage. For 
example, using event study techniques, Lin et al. (2020) show significant evidence of opportunistic pre-official 
announcement insider trading related to data breaches. For this study, a range of event windows were initially 
chosen starting from up to two days before the event and varying in length from 2 up to 20 trading days to give 
visibility of these effects and others such as sector specific effects reported by e.g. Tweneboah-Kodua et al. 
(2018) who observed more rapid response from the financial services sector, for instance. 
3.4 Hypothesis development 
For event studies, the null hypothesis maintains that there are no abnormal returns within the event window. 
The standard deviation of abnormal returns during the event window is described by equation (5) where 𝑀𝑖  
refers to the number of non-missing returns. The t-value for the CAR over the event window was then calculated 
according to equation (6). 












√(𝑇3 − 𝑇2 + 1)𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖
2
 (6) 
                                                                
3 Ultimate parent companies were identified from Dun & Bradstreet (https://www.dnb.com) 
4 R version 4.0.3 (2020-10-10) 
5 EventStudy package version 0.36.900 (API version 0.374-alpha) 
476
 
Adrian Ford et al 
 
For cross-sectional analyses the t-statistic (𝑡𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅) was calculated based on the CAAR as shown in (8) with 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅  
being the standard deviation of the CARs for each firm i across the sample of size N (7). 
















This approach to significance testing is consistent with e.g. Castillo and Falzon (2018), Deane et al. (2019) and 
Jeong et al. (2019). Indeed, Deane at al. (2019: 115) state that “the t test is considered to be the best framework 
for analyzing statistical significance in most event study frameworks and to be relatively robust”. 
4. Results and discussion 
Event studies were carried out as described above for 10 event windows of varying length across all 25 GDPR 
fine events. A visualisation of the overall results is shown in Figure 2. It appears at first glance that the most 
negative impact is seen around the 4-day event window (0, 3) with the market value gradually recovering over 
longer windows and beginning to see positive recovery 10 days after the event. After 20 days, for IAG (Vueling) 
and EDF (Madrileña Red de Gas) the abnormal returns had grown to over 10% either way yet the median CAR 
remained much closer to zero. 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of event windows 
A CAAR was calculated for multiple firms across each window and is shown in Table 1. Here the 3 and 4-day 
event windows (0, 2), (0, 3) show the most negative abnormal returns and are statistically significant at the 1% 
level. It is interesting to note that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for the three earlier event windows 
involving pre-event days thereby indicating no information leakage prior to the fine announcements and 
consistent with the lack of uncertainty in the event dates for this exercise. As above, there is also lack of 
statistical significance for the longer windows indicative of a tendency of market recovery towards zero 
abnormal returns over time as reported by Dyckman et al. (1984). The event window (0, 3) showed the most 
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negative (almost 1%) CAAR, consistent with the findings of Goel and Shawky (2009). Within this window, 19 of 
the 25 events (76%) had abnormal returns of less than zero, therefore this window was chosen as the basis for 
further analyses. Usage of this event window (0, 3) has been previously reported in studies of this type e.g. Hinz 
et al. (2015), Rosati et al. (2019). 
Table 1: CAAR by event window 
Event 
Window N CAAR tCAAR  % Negative CAR 
(-2, 2) 25 -0.0049 -1.6188  56 
(-1, 1) 25 -0.0041 -1.2112  64 
(-1, 0) 25 -0.0022 -0.6746  52 
(0, 1) 25 -0.0064 -2.7453 ** 72 
(0, 2) 25 -0.0072 -3.0748 *** 80 
(0, 3) 25 -0.0096 -3.2341 *** 76 
(0, 4) 25 -0.0064 -2.0190 * 72 
(0, 5) 25 -0.0061 -1.4128  56 
(0, 10) 25 0.0020 0.2795  48 
(0, 20) 25 0.0011 0.0968  40 
 250 -0.0044   62 
*,**,*** Represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
An analysis by ultimate parent company of CAAR is shown in Table 2. It can be seen that four firms suffered 
more than one fine under GDPR, but no more than two during the date range of this study. The firm suffering 
the most negative abnormal return is listed first and the most positive last. The overall average fine levied was 
found to be almost €17m and it appears that the supervisory authorities have been relatively lenient so far with 
the average penalty sitting at around 0.15% of previous year’s annual revenue (the greatest being just over 1%) 
and nowhere near the possible maximum of 4% for more serious GDPR infringements6. That said, the average 
loss in market capitalisation based on the CAAR was estimated to be of the order of nearly 29,000 times that at 
€1.2bn. Clearly this figure is heavily skewed by the €19bn loss Alphabet Inc. experienced following their €50m 
fine. It seems that a huge market value is little protection against abnormal returns with the smallest company 
in the sample, Österreichische Post, having a slightly positive return. Also noteworthy was the seemingly 
innocuous €2k fine for BNP Paribas precipitating a market value fall of nearly €1bn. It was also noted that there 
was only one case (Österreichische Post) out of all 25 where the ratio of change in market capitalisation to fine 
was less than one, so firms need to recognise that the overall financial impact of a GDPR penalty is likely to be 
much greater than the value of the actual fine itself. 
Table 2: Analysis by ultimate parent company 
Ultimate 
Parent 






















United Internet 1 
-
0.0342 
5,131 9550 0.1861 7,104 242,957 25 
Endesa SA 1 
-
0.0300 








20,674 130 0.0006 18,639 380,236 2,925 
Delivery Hero 1 
-
0.0198 
665 195 0.0294 23,691 469,082 2,401 
Alphabet Inc 1 
-
0.0153 
120,380 50000 0.0415 1,245,280 19,052,788 381 
BNP Paribas 1 
-
0.0152 






24,406 102315 0.4192 10,354 153,246 1 
                                                                
6 Note that percentages were calculated based on ultimate parent revenues and not necessarily that of the infringing legal entity. 
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43,666 60 0.0001 40,960 532,482 8,875 
Eni SpA 1 
-
0.0123 
75,822 11500 0.0152 33,157 407,831 35 
Deutsche Telekom 2 
-
0.0110 




18,507 110390 0.5965 41,340 400,995 4 
Enel SpA 1 
-
0.0049 
74,221 6 0.0000 82,095 402,266 67,044 
ING Group 1 
-
0.0046 
18,304 80 0.0004 34,953 160,784 2,010 
OTP Bank 1 
-
0.0019 






3,937 5 0.0001 4,954 3,468 694 
Électricité de France 1 0.0014 68,976 12 0.0000 31,142 43,599 3,633 
Engie SA 1 0.0016 60,596 60 0.0001 30,778 49,245 821 
Österreichische Post 1 0.0019 1,958 18000 0.9191 2,320 4,408 0 
Telefónica 2 0.0042 48,693 39 0.0001 20,019 84,080 2,156 




38,235 16796 0.1462 81,313 1,177,602 28,901 
† Revenue of fiscal year prior to the event (consistent with GPDR penalties). Currencies converted based on rate at time 
of event. 
‡ Current market capitalisation (Feb-21). Currencies converted based on rate at 31/12/2019. 
Noting that of the top four negative CAAR events in Table 2, three of them are related to electricity companies 
it would certainly be interesting to look at industry sector analysis as recommended by e.g. Tweneboah-Kodua 
et al. (2018). A breakdown by sector is shown in Table 3. Here it can be seen that the most reactive industry 
sector was Consumer Cyclical (-1.5%), however, only Utilities, Communication Services and Financial Services 
showed statistical significance of non-zero (negative) abnormal returns albeit only at the 10% level. 
Table 3: CAAR by industry sector 
Industry Sector N CAAR tCAAR  % Negative CAR 
Consumer Cyclical 2 -0.0148 -2.9208  100 
Utilities 6 -0.0138 -2.1852 * 67 
Energy 1 -0.0123   100 
Communication Services 7 -0.0109 -2.1098 * 86 
Industrials 3 -0.0092 -0.8761  33 
Financial Services 5 -0.0086 -2.1881 * 100 
Real Estate 1 0.0320 -2.0190  0 
 25 -0.0096   76 
* Represents statistical significance at the 10% level. 
During the data collection exercise, it was noted that some of the larger GDPR fines had been appealed and the 
results of the appeals formally announced. This enabled an additional data set to be built (Table 4) and analysed 
in the same way as the initial announcements. 
Table 4: Summary of GDPR fine appeals 
Ultimate Parent Date Original fine Result of appeal 
Alphabet Inc 12/06/2020 €50m Rejected 
International Airlines 16/10/2020 £190m Reduced to £20m 
Marriott 30/10/2020 £99.2m Reduced to £18.4m 
United Internet 12/11/2020 €9.55m Reduced to €900k 
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The expected outcome of these appeal announcements would be negative market price impact for the 
unsuccessful appeal by Alphabet Inc and positive for the other three examples where the fines were massively 
reduced. The results are shown in Table 5. It appears there is indeed, a negative trend for Alphabet beginning 
on the announcement day itself and not disappearing until 20 days after the event. International Airlines has a 
strongly increasing positive return after the event whereas, although positive, United Internet remains fairly 
constant. Marriott however, experienced some negative market sentiment after the event. One has to be 
mindful of market conditions and volatility due to the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on (especially the 
hospitality) industry here. That was the reason the original data set was capped at 31/12/2019 and, in analysing 
these more recent events, the results were not found to be statistical significant thus the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal returns still stands. 
Table 5: CAR by event window of fines appealed 
Event  Alphabet Inc International Airlines Marriott United Internet 
Window N CAR tCAR CAR tCAR CAR tCAR CAR tCAR 
(-2, 2) 1 0.0164 0.5686 0.1459 1.1842 0.0455 0.7426 0.1039 1.9689 
(-1, 1) 1 0.0026 0.1164 0.0499 0.5229 0.0143 0.3013 0.0563 1.3715 
(-1, 0) 1 0.0054 0.2960 -0.0110 -0.1412 0.0346 0.8929 0.0431 1.2859 
(0, 1) 1 -0.0076 -0.4166 0.0345 0.4427 -0.0045 -0.1179 0.0598 1.7917 
(0, 2) 1 -0.0075 -0.3357 0.1059 1.1096 -0.0009 -0.0192 0.0812 1.9865 
(0, 3) 1 -0.0008 -0.0310 0.0899 0.8158 -0.0187 -0.3463 0.0839 1.7775 
(0, 4) 1 -0.0148 -0.5131 0.1349 1.0949 -0.0230 -0.3810 0.0753 1.4269 
(0, 5) 1 -0.0171 -0.5412 0.1523 1.1284 0.0073 0.1104 0.0796 1.3770 
(0, 10) 1 -0.0379 -0.8858 0.1596 0.8733 0.1250 1.3959 0.0827 1.0566 
(0, 20) 1 0.0160 0.2707 0.3824 1.5145 0.1686 1.3626 0.0902 0.8340 
5. Conclusion 
We have seen how the announcement of monetary penalties related to GDPR infringement can result in 
(statistically significant) negative CARs of around 1% up to three days after the event. It was also observed that 
the economic impact on the market value of a publicly listed firm far outweighs the monetary value of the fine 
itself in almost all cases, and that a very small fine can have huge impact on market value (cf. BNP Paribas). We 
also know from the literature that CARs of a similar magnitude are generated at the time of the initial 
announcement of a breach. Considering all of these negative factors, the need for firms to invest in cyber security 
to protect data privacy is clearly underpinned by this research, as well as showing a clear economic impact of 
the introduction of the GDPR itself. 
 
In light of the recent introduction of the GDPR, the dataset for this study was (necessarily) limited. Once more 
data becomes available and the market recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic, future research is expected to 
give a better idea of the impact of GDPR infringement fines on publicly listed firm value. Although four examples 
of GDPR fine appeals were identified and positive returns were observed where those appeals were successful 
(and the reverse), the results were not statistically significant, and we were unable to reject the null hypothesis 
of zero abnormal returns. Future research is needed in this area also – recently there has been news of Deutsche 
Wohnen appealing their €14.5m fine and, with the high-profile reductions of the fines for International Airlines 
(BA) and Marriott, a precedent appears to have been set with the ICO recognising and encouraging infringing 
firms to invest in cyber security measures (Macfarlanes 2020). Future studies may, therefore, reveal more about 
the positive impact of the GDPR on cyber security investment following its introduction and subsequent punitive 
actions. In this study only 2 out of 21 (10%) of ultimate parent firms were US based with the balance being 
European, therefore this work also begins to offset the strong US bias of these type of studies in the literature. 
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